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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State of Rigalia and the State of Ardenia submit the present
dispute concerning the Zetian Provinces to the International Court of Justice
by Special Agreement, dated 5 May 2010, pursuant to article 40(1) of the
Statute of the International Court ofJustice. The parties have agreed to the
contents of the Compromis submitted as part of the Special Agreement.
Both the State of Rigalia and the State of Ardenia have accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with article 36(2) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. The State of Rigalia
undertakes to accept the judgment of this Court as final and binding and
shall execute it in good faith in its entirety.
Distinguished Brief
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The State of Rigalia respectfully asks this Honourable Court:
A. whether Rigalia's drone strikes in Rigalia and Ardenia are
consistent with international law, including international
humanitarian law, international human rights law and the Charter
of the United Nations, and whether there are any grounds for
ordering their cessation;
B. whether the attack on Bakchar Valley Hospital is attributable to
Rigalia, whether said attack was an act of aggression or any other
violation of international law, whether Rigalia has a substantive
or remedial obligation to investigate the attack, and whether
Rigalia is required to compensate Ardenia;
C. whether Rigalia's ban of the Mavazi for Zetian women and girls
is consistent with its obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms ofDiscrimination against Women; and
D. whether Ardenia's failure to investigate and prosecute the alleged
corruption and its failure to provide legal assistance to Rigalia
constitute breaches of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and
whether the failure of the Ardenian NCP to respond to the
complaint by the CRBC constitutes a breach of the OECD
Decision on MNE Guidelines.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The mountainous and economically underdeveloped Zetian Provinces
straddle the Ardenian- Rigalian border. The Zetian Provinces comprise the
Southern Provinces of Ardenia and the Northern Provinces of Rigalia. The
Northern Provinces are rich in coltan, an important natural resource.
The Zetian Provinces are populated by ethnic Zetians who live
according to tribal custom and practise the Masinto religion. Their
autonomous communities are governed by tribal leaders.
Ardenia and Rigalia have granted citizenship to all Zetians.
The Masinto religion obliges Zetian women to wear the Mavazi, a
headcovering that hampers the wearer's ability to work in the heat. Under
tribal council laws, Zetian women are publicly flogged and exiled for not
wearing the Mavazi, prohibited from driving and taking paid employment
and forced into marriage from as young as eight or nine.
Rigalia's President, Teemu Khutai, has denounced these practices as
oppressive. Rigalia has been unable to enforce its laws in the Northern
Provinces where the tribal councils enjoy virtually 100 per cent control.
Ardenia, a decentralised State, accords Zetian tribal leaders autonomy to
govern as they wish.
The Zetian Democratic Party (ZDP) purportedly represents more than
75 per cent of Zetians in the Northern Provinces. It has sponsored efforts of
the Zetian separatist movement (ZSM), a ZDP-affiliated group.
On 5 May 2008, the ZDP-dominated meeting of the Joint Tribal
Council of the Northern Provinces produced a manifesto demanding a
greater share of coltan revenue for Zetians, non-interference in Zetian
affairs, and support for a future Zetian State.
President Khutai responded by emphasising national unity and the
need to modernise the impoverished Zetian Provinces. He spoke out against
tribal leaders imposing the Mavazi on women. Violence followed in the
Northern Provinces, necessitating deployment of Rigalian forces. Disorder
prompted President Khutai to invoke emergency powers in Rigalia's
Constitution. Citing concerns over safety and the rights of Zetian women
and girls, President Khutai also introduced a bill to ban the wearing of the
Mavazi in public spaces and when receiving public services.
ZSM leaders launched a violent campaign to secure full independence.
In December 2008, ZSM members bombed a bridge in Rigaliaville, killing
over 130 Rigalians. Over the next two months, ZSM suicide bombings
occurred at a Rigalian school and hospital, killing 25 civilians and
wounding 112 more. An attack on a public school occurred when a terrorist
escaped detection by wearing a Mavazi.
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Allegations subsequently surfaced that Rigalian Zetians were meeting
in Ardenia to elude Rigalian troops. Rigalian intelligence corroborated this
information.
In March, the media reported President Arwen had brokered an
agreement with Zetian tribal leaders. It alleged that President Arwen had
agreed to support a future Zetian State on Rigalian territory in exchange for
the renunciation of secessionist claims against Ardenia. President Arwen
has not denied these allegations. Her office confirms the meeting occurred.
On 22 March, as a result of these developments, President Khutai
declared war on the ZSM and its supporters. The Mavazi bill was enacted
the same day.
Confronted by geographical and cultural barriers to pursuing ZSM
attackers, President Khutai appealed to President Sophia Ratko of Morgania
to deploy Predator Drones to Fort Raucus, a Morganian base in Rigalia.
Against a backdrop of ZSM threats to Morganian interests, President Ratko
acceded to the request. Morganian personnel operate the drones from
Morganville. They receive targeting information from Rigalian-paid
informants, but retain discretion in launching attacks.
From September 2009 to March 2010, drone strikes in Rigalia killed
15 important ZSM leaders. 230 Zetian civilians were killed.
On 15 March 2010, a drone strike took place in Ardenia against Adar
Bermal, a key ZSM leader who planned and initiated attacks against
Rigalia. A missile struck his house, killing everyone inside. During the
attack, an unauthorised phone call from an informant distracted the drone
operator and caused her to fire accidentally on Bakchar Valley Hospital.
Rigalia's Defence Minister expressed regret at the civilian loss of life.
In early 2009, President Khutai requested an investigation into bribery
allegations concerning Mineral Dynamics Incorporated (MDI), an Ardenian
State-owned corporation, and Rigalian Refineries Inc. (RRI), a Rigalian
State-owned enterprise.
There exist two allegations. First, that MDI secured the renewal of its
contract with RRI by offering support and payment on trust to the Zetian
Refugee Fund (ZRF) and Clyde Zangara respectively. Zangara is both the
nephew of Leo Bikra, RRI's President and Director-General, and founder of
the ZRF. The second allegation was that MDI transporters responded to
solicitations from tribal council members to pay mandatory undocumented
fees to ensure the added security of its mining operation and the smooth
delivery of its products. While these allegations were reported in the media
in 2002, Ardenia did not investigate until 2009.
In 2009, a former MDI employee involved in the contract renewal
further substantiated the first allegation. While he could not confirm the
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MDI transporter payment allegations, he stated such payments were
common practice when MDI operated in similarly sensitive areas.
Ardenia only investigated these allegations in response to a request
from Rigalia for mutual legal assistance (MLA) sent on 30 April 2009.
MDI intensely lobbied influential Ardenian government officials to drop
the inquiry, hosting lavish receptions for this purpose. On 3 June 2009,
Ardenian Public Prosecutor Sam Strong dropped the investigation, citing
unexplained security concerns. Twelve days later, however, President
Arwen hinted the decision was influenced by national economic concerns.
Rigalia's MLA request sought, inter alia: (a) MDI's bank records
since 2001, (b) correspondence between, on the one hand, Clyde Zangara or
the ZRF and, on the other, Leo Bikra or the President of MDI, and (c)
correspondence between the ZRF and tribal council members. Ardenia did
not respond to Rigalia's request.
When Rigalia raised the MLA request on 23-24 March 2010, Ardenia
cited its bank secrecy legislation as the basis for its delay. Ardenia also
refused request (c), claiming it was irrelevant to Rigalia's investigation.
Rigalia and Ardenia are Parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
and have criminalised the bribery of a foreign public official. Ardenia is a
member of the OECD, while Rigalia is an adherent to all related OECD
anti-bribery instruments.
Rigalia and Ardenia have both established National Contact Points in
accordance with the OECD Decision on MNE Guidelines, to which they
both adhere. On 1 July 2009, the Committee for Responsible Business
Conduct (CRBC), a government-funded Rigalian NGO, filed a complaint
with Ardenia's NCP, alleging violations of the MNE Guidelines by MDI
and RRI.
Two days later, the Ardenian NCP refused to examine the complaint
on grounds that, inter alia: 1) the complaint should be dealt with by
Rigalia's NCP as the alleged misconduct occurred in Rigalia; 2) the MNE
Guidelines do not apply to RRI; and 3) investigations were already
underway in Ardenia and Rigalia. Ardenia's NCP did not respond to a
written request from the CRBC for a meeting between all interested parties,
including the Rigalian NCP.
Ardenia and Rigalia have exchanged diplomatic notes. The Zetian
situation has also been discussed in the UN Security Council. Following
failed negotiations, the Parties have invoked article 36(2) of the Court's
Statute. An Application and Compromis were filed with the Court on 5 May
2010.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A.
Ardenia's claims are inadmissible insofar as they relate to drone
strikes in Rigalia. As a Party to the Geneva Conventions and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Ardenia has an interest in
Rigalia's compliance with these treaties. Absent direct injury, however, this
interest does not permit instituting proceedings in this Court.
In any event, Rigalia's strikes comply with international humanitarian
law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). IHL applies because
a non-international armed conflict has arisen between Rigalia and the
Zetian separatist movement (ZSM). Rigalia's use of precision weaponry
and informants discharges its IHL obligation to take feasible precautions to
verify targets and minimise civilian casualties. The strikes are also
proportionate, given the anticipated military advantage of eliminating ZSM
aggressors. As the strikes are IHL-compliant, they are not arbitrarily
depriving Zetians of life.
Strikes in Ardenia are justified as self-defence. Non-State actors are
capable of executing an 'armed attack' triggering the right of self-defence.
Cumulatively, ZSM attacks constitute an 'armed attack'. Rigalia's strikes
are necessary as Ardenia is unwilling or unable to act against the ZSM.
They are proportionate to the purpose of ending ZSM aggression.
. The strikes are consistent with Rigalia's obligation to accord the
Zetians' internal self-determination as they are directed at suppressing an
insurgency.
B.
The Bakchar Valley Hospital attack is not attributable to Rigalia.
Those involved in the attack did not exercise Rigalian governmental
authority, had not been placed at Rigalia's disposal and were not under
Rigalia's effective control. Rigalia has not adopted the attack as its own.
In any event, the strike occurred in the lawful exercise of Rigalia's
right of self-defence. Alternatively, it was not sufficiently grave to
constitute an act of aggression.
The strike complied with IHL. Rigalia directed its attack against Adar
Bermal, a lawful target. As with all the strikes, Rigalia took feasible
precautions. The attack was proportionate. As the IHL-compliant strike did
not arbitrarily deprive persons of life, Rigalia is not obligated to investigate.
Alternatively, investigation is an inappropriate modality of
satisfaction.
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C
The ban on wearing the Mavazi in public spaces and when receiving
public services is consistent with the rights of Zetian women and girls under
IHRL. Ardenia cannot assert a claim in diplomatic protection in the absence
of an affected national whose predominant nationality is Ardenian.
The ban permissibly limits the freedom of Zetian women and girls to
manifest religious belief and enjoy minority culture as it is prescribed by
law and is necessary to protect public safety, order and the fundamental
rights of Zetian women. The Mavazi is violently imposed on women and is
a threat to public safety, evidenced by its use in a terrorist attack. Rigalia
has a margin of appreciation in determining the necessity of the ban.
The ban does not violate the economic, social and cultural rights of
Zetian women and girls as they remain able to access public services by not
wearing the Mavazi. The ban is necessary in a democratic society as it has
the purpose and effect of increasing equality and improving the realisation
of economic, social and cultural rights.
D.
Ardenia breached the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ('OABC') and
the OECD Decision on MNE Guidelines ('Decision'), binding instruments
to which Ardenia and Rigalia are States Parties. These breaches directly
injure Rigalia.
Ardenia breached article 5 of the OABC. In responding to allegations
that Mineral Dynamics Incorporated (MDI) had bribed foreign public
officials, an offence under the OABC, Ardenia failed to exercise its
prosecutorial discretion in conformity with article 5. For seven years,
Ardenia failed to investigate allegations that created a well-founded
suspicion of an offence. Ardenia never prosecuted MDI and allowed
considerations prohibited by article 5 to influence its decision to suspend an
inquiry.
Further, Ardenia has breached its obligation under article 9 of the
OABC to provide prompt and effective legal assistance to States Parties
when requested as Ardenia has failed to satisfy Rigalia's request for mutual
legal assistance for over one year, without lawful excuse.
Additionally, in refusing to examine the complaint by the Committee
for Responsible Business Conduct, Ardenia's National Contact Point
breached its obligation to take due account of the Decision's Procedural
Guidance.
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PLEADINGS
I. RIGALIA'S PREDATOR DRONE STRIKES IN RIGALIA AND ARDENIA ARE
CONSISTENT WITH RIGALIA'S RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
THUS THE COURT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER CESSATION OF THE
DRONE ATTACKS
An armed conflict has arisen between Rigalia and the Zetian separatist
movement (ZSM). Customary international humanitarian law (IHL),
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (GCs),' and international
human rights law (IHRL) govern the conflict. Rigalia accepts attribution of
the Predator Drone strikes ('the strikes') on the limited basis that it has
adopted them in these proceedings. 2 The strikes comply with Rigalia's IHL
obligations. Further, they neither arbitrarily deprive Zetians of life, nor
deny them self-determination. Strikes in Ardenia are justified as self-
defence under article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (Charter).3
A. Ardenia does not have standing in respect ofRigalia's drone strikes in
Rigalia
Ardenia's capacity to enforce fundamental principles of IHL,4 the right
to life' and the collective right to self-determination6  is governed
exclusively by the GCs and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).7 Absent any direct injury, Ardenia's capacity to
enforce the GCs is limited to diplomatic protest, action through
international organisations, and not recognising conduct which breaches
Convention obligations.8  In addition, the ICCPR 'concern[s] the
1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth)
[1949] 75 UNTS 287, art 3(1)(a) ['GC-IV'].
2. . International Law Commission (ILC), Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res 56/83, UN Doc AIRES/56/83 (2001) art 11 ['ASR'].
3. [1945] 1 UNTS XVI.
4. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
[2004] ICJ Rep 136, 199 ['Israeli Wall'].
5. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment) [ 1970]
ICJ Rep 3, 32.
6. East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, 102 ['East Timor'].
7. [1966] 999 UNTS 171 ['ICCPR']; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969] 1155
UNTS 331, art 32 ['VCLT]; Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (2009) 445.
8. Israeli Wall, n4, 200.
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endowment of individuals with rights' and does not confer standing on
States independently of diplomatic protection.9
Ardenia does not have standing in respect of Rigalia's drone strikes in
Rigalia, as it cannot point to any identified Ardenian national affected by
said strikes over whom it can exercise diplomatic protection.10
B. Rigalia is complying with international humanitarian law (IHL) and
international human rights law (IHRL) obligations applicable to the non-
international armed conflict in the Zetian Provinces
1. An armed conflict has arisen between Rigalia and the Zetian separatist
movement (ZSM)
An armed conflict arises where there is 'protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups'." This
threshold has been met. Protracted armed violence is evidenced by the
seriousness and escalation of ZSM attacks; 2 the deployment of Rigalian
forces to the crisis area;" Rigalia's recognition of ZSM belligerency;14 and
Security Council recognition of hostilities. 5 The ZSM's organisation is
evidenced by its military chain of command;16 its successful execution of
'large-scale' attacks;" its de facto control over territory through dominant
representation on Zetian tribal councils;' 8 its claim to Zetian statehood
9. Human Rights Committee ['HRC'], General Comment 24, UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), [17].
10. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v UK) (Jurisdiction) [ 1924] PCU (Ser
A) No 2, 12.
11. GC-IV art 3; Prosecutor v Tadid (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal) (ICTY, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995) [70] ['Tadid (Interlocutory Appeal)'].
12. Compromis, [29]; Prosecutor v Bofkoski (ICTY, IT-04-82-T, 10 July 2008) [177]
['Bolkoski']; Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v Israel (2007) 46 ILM 375, 381 ['PCATI'].
13. Compromis, [15]-[16], [18]-[19]; Prosecutor v Haradinaj (ICTY, IT-04-84-T, 3 April
2008) [49] ['Haradinaj']; Prosecutor v Limal (ICTY, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2009) [169] ['Lima/'].
14. Compromis, [21]; International Committee of the Red Cross ['ICRC'], Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949 (1987), 1320-21.
15. Compromis, [32]; Bolkoski, n12, [177].
16. Compromis, [30]; Prosecutor v Tadid (Appeal Judgment) (ICTY, IT-94-1-A, 15 July
1999) [120] ['Tadi (Appeal)'].
17. Limaj, nl3, [129].
18. Compromis, [6], [13], [18].
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based on this control;'9 and its ability to 'speak with one voice' in
negotiations.20
2. The conflict is non-international in character
An international armed conflict is one that arises 'between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties'.21 International tribunals have
consistently held that international armed conflicts require 'a resort to
armed force between States'.2 2 This criterion is not satisfied because
Ardenia has not deployed armed forces against Rigalia and the ZSM is a
non-State group.23 Nor is the ZSM acting on Ardenia's behalf according to
the applicable test of 'overall control' 2 4 as Ardenia is not coordinating 'the
general planning of its military activity'.25 The ZSM's secessionist aims do
not internationalise the conflict, because Rigalia is neither 'founded on
26racist criteria' nor is a colonial or occupying power.
3. Rigalia's strikes are consistent with the law of non-international armed
conflict
The non-international armed conflict between Rigalia and the ZSM is
governed by the 'minimum rules applicable to international and to non-
international conflicts' expressed in common article 3 and customary IHL.27
As any lacuna in the laws of war is resolved according to custom and 'the
19. Pictet (ed), Commentary to 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958) 36.
20. Limaj, n13, [129]; Haradinaj, n13, [88]; Compromis, [6], [18], [21], [30].
21. GC-IVart 2.
22. Tadid (Interlocutory Appeal), n15, [70]. Emphasis added. See also Prosecutor v Delalic
(Trial Judgment) (ICTY, IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998) [183]; Haradinaj, nl7, [37]-[49]; Bolkoski,
n16, [175]; Limaj, n17, [84].
23. Kreb, 'Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing Transnational
Armed Conflicts' (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 245, 255-56.
24. Tadi6 (Appeal), n20, [131]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment)
(International Court of Justice, General List No 91, 26 February 2007) [404] ['Bosnian Genocide'].
25. Ibid.
26. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) [1977] 1125 UNTS 3, art 1(4);
ICRC, n14, 54.
27. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits)
[1986] ICJ Rep 14, 114 ['Nicaragua'].
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laws of humanity', these rules apply to transnational armed conflicts
wherever there is protracted armed violence.2 8
a. The strikes are consistent with customary IHL and common article 3 of
the GCs
In non-international armed conflicts, belligerents must: distinguish
between civilians and 'persons who are actively participating in hostilities',
attacking only the latter;29 do everything feasible to verify that targets are
lawful and that civilian loss of life is minimised; and refrain from launching
disproportionate attacks.30 ZSM members who have assumed a 'continuous
combat function' may be targeted at any time.3 1
Rigalia is taking feasible precautions to verify lawful targets and
minimise civilian loss of life. Feasibility is determined by what is
practicable in the circumstances. 32 , Given the mountainous terrain and
hostile populace of the Northern Provinces, Rigalia's use of precision
weaponry" in conjunction with local informants and corroborative UAV
surveillance discharges its obligation to verify lawful targets.34 In any
event, Ardenia must adduce 'fully conclusive evidence' to prove that
Rigalia is impermissibly attacking civilians, which is an allegation of
28. Hague Convention IV- Laws and Customs of War on Land, 205 Consol TS 277, Preamble
['Hague Convention']; HRC, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab
Territories, Including Palestine, UN Doe E/CN.4/2001/121 (2001) 39; Jinks, 'September 11 and the
Laws of War' (2003) 28 Yale Journal ofInternational Law 1, 41; Ben-Naftali and Michaeli, "'We Must
Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law": A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings' (2004)
36 Cornell International Law Journal 233, 271; Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 S Ct 2749 (2006) 2757.
29. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep
226, 257 ['Nuclear Weapons']; Fleck (ed), Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2008) 614;
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1 (Rules)
(2005) 3-8, 19-24 (Rules 1, 6) ['CIHL Rules'].
30. GC-IV art 3(1); Nuclear Weapons, n29, 257; CIHL Rules, n29, 19-24, 55-56 (Rules 6, 16);
Prosecutor v Kupregki6 (Trial Judgment) (ICTY, Case No IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000) [524]
['Kupreikid'].
31. ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law (2009) 34 ['DPH Study'].
32. Judicial and Similar Proceedings: Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission: Partial Award
regarding Ethiopia's Central Front Claim 2 (2004) 43 ILM 1275, 1295; Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010) 4.
33. O'Connell, 'Lawful Use of Combat Drones', Testimony Submitted to US House of
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security
and Foreign Affairs, Second Hearing on Drone Warfare (28 April 2010) 1.
34. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law:
Volume 2 (Practice) (2005) 357-60 ['CIHL Practice'].
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'exceptional gravity'.3 5 No such evidence exists. The elimination of '15
important Zetian separatist leaders' commends the opposite conclusion.36
As the proportionality rule attaches to specific attacks, not military
campaigns as a whole,3 7 Rigalia's strikes would be disproportionate only if
the civilian loss of life expected from each strike would exceed its concrete
and direct military advantage. In each operation, the anticipated military
advantage of disrupting 'increasingly deadly attacks' by eliminating
important separatist leaders outweighed the comparatively low civilian loss
of life expected to result from a precision strike.
b. Rigalia's IHL-compliant strikes do not arbitrarily deprive Zetians of life
under IHRL
Rigalia's obligation not to arbitrarily deprive Zetians of life under
article 6 of the ICCPR applies during an armed conflict alongside the
GCs.40 Where two treaty provisions are inconsistent, the specific legal rule
prevails over a. general one.4 1 IHL rules are more specific than IHRL
because they regulate the more permissive use of lethal force in times of
armed conflict, whereas IHRL 'deals with the inherent rights of the person
to be protected at all times against abusive power'.42 Accordingly, IHL rules
are determinative of what constitutes arbitrary deprivation of life during
hostilities. Rigalia's IHL-compliant strikes cannot, therefore, have breached
article 6.
In any event, strikes beyond Rigalia's territory need not comply with
article 6. A State owes ICCPR obligations only to persons 'within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction'.43 As States can ensure human rights
only where they exercise sovereign control," 'jurisdiction' in this context
35. Bosnian Genocide, n24, [209].
36. Compromis, [29].
37. CIHL Practice, n34, 326-27; Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of
International Armed Conflict (2nd ed, 2010) 94; ICRC, nl4, 2218.
38. CIHL Rules, n29, 46-50 (Rule 14).
39. Compromis, [28]-[29].
40. Nuclear Weapons, n29, 240.
41. VCLT art 32; Nuclear Weapons, n29, 240; Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation) (Provisional
Measures) [2008] ICJ Rep 353, 387.
42. Droege, 'The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human
Rights Law in Situations ofArmed Conflict' (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 310, 310.
43. ICCPR art 2(1).
44. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd ed, 2005)
43-44.
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refers to a State's power over territory, not individuals. 45 Rigalia lacks
territorial control in Ardenia. Hence, its obligations do not extend there.
C. Rigalia's use offorce against the ZSM in Ardenia isjustified as self-
defence
The strikes in Ardenia are justified as self-defence, being a necessary
and proportionate response to the ZSM's armed attack.46 Rigalia's failure to
report its action to the Security Council does not estop it from asserting
self-defence. Reporting is merely a procedural mechanism for monitoring
compliance with Charter commitments.47
1. Non-State actors are capable of carrying out armed attacks
Customary law permits States to use force extraterritorially in self-
defence against non-State actors. A rule of customary law can emerge
rapidly if State practice is 'extensive and virtually uniform' and evinces the
international community's recognition that a rule of law is involved.48
Following 11 September 2001, the near-universal practice of NATO, OAS,
ANZUS and EU member States in acknowledging the US-led response
against al-Qaeda as lawful self-defence brought about a customary rule
permitting self-defence against non-State actors.49 Security Council
Resolutions in response to the 11 September attacks also endorsed self-
defence against non-State actors and helped crystallise the customary rule.50
45. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v
Uganda) (Merits) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, 231 ['Armed Activities']; Israeli Wall, n4, 180; Bankovic v
Belgium (2007) 44 EHRR SE5, 85-86; Loizidou v Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99, 130.
46. Charter art 51; Nicaragua, n27, 93-94.
47. Ruys, 'Armed Attack' and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law
and Practice (2010) 8-9.
48. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark v
Netherlands) (Judgment) [ 1969] ICJ Rep 3, 43.
49. Statement by the NATO Secretary-General (2001) 40 ILM 1268; Resolution of the Twenty-
fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc No RC24/RES1/01 (21
September 2001); Council of the EU, '2372nd Council Meeting (General Affairs)' (Press Release, 8-9
October 2001) 7; Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the USA, UN Doc
S/2001/946 (2001); Antonio Cassese, 'Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
International Law' (2001) 12 European Journal ofInternational Law 993, 997.
50. Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, SC Res 1373, UN
Doc S/RES/1373 (2001); Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, SC Res
1368, UN Doc S/RES/1368 (2001); Armed Activities, n45, 172-73 (Judge Simma), 314 (Judge
Kooijmans); Israeli Wall, n4, 215 (Judge Higgins).
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Further, article 51 must be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary
meaning and the Charter's object and purpose.5' Article 51 refers to an
'armed attack' without specifying the attacker. Consistent with the
Charter's object of maintaining international security, a purposive
interpretation of article 51 must recognise that non-State actors can inflict
attacks equally lethal to those executed by States. 52
2. The accumulation of ZSM attacks constituted an armed attack against
Rigalia
ZSM attacks, which this Court may consider as a whole for the
purposes of identifying an 'armed attack'," are of sufficient scale and
gravity to trigger the right of self-defence.54 They have caused extensive
civilian fatalities and are linked together by a 'violent campaign '.
Regardless, the Charter does not exclude the customary right of self-
defence against an imminent attack by the ZSM. 56
3. Rigalia is using necessary and proportionate force against legitimate
Zetian targets
Self-defensive action must be necessary as a last resort, and
proportionate to the purpose of ending the aggression.57
Cross-border force is necessary where an aggressor organises attacks
from another State which cannot or will not end the aggression. 8 ZSM
members plan attacks against Rigalia from Ardenia.59 Ardenia is either
unable to act against them owing to the mountainous terrain and
51. VCLT art 31(1); Compromis, [37].
52. Charter art 1(1); Greenwood, 'International Law and the "War Against Terrorism"' (2002)
78 International Affairs 301, 307-308.
53. Nicaragua, n27, 120; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic ofIran v United States ofAmerica)
(Merits) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, 192 ['Oil Platforms']; Armed Activities, n45, 223, 315 (Judge Kooijmans);
Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) 279; Dinstein, War, Aggression and
Self-Defence (2005) 230-31.
54. Nicaragua, n27, 101; Armed Activities, n45, 338 (Judge Simma), 314-15 (Judge
Kooijmans); Jus ad Bellum (Ethiopia v State ofEritrea) (2006) 45 ILM 430.
55. Compromis, [18], [28].
56. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (1958) 187-88.
57. Jennings, 'The Caroline and McLeod Cases' (1938) 32 American Journal ofInternational
Law 82, 82-84; Nicaragua, n27, 103; Nuclear Weapons, n29, 245; Oil Platforms, n53, 187; Armed
Activities, n45, 223.
58. Armed Activities, n45, 334 (Judge Simma), 307 (Judge Kooijmans); Jennings and Watts
(eds), Oppenheim's International Law, vol 1 (9th ed, 2002) 419.
59. Compromis, [19].
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uncooperative populace,60 or is unwilling to do so,6 ' as evidenced by its
collusion with the ZSM. 62 The Court may infer such collusion from tacit
admissions by President Arwen and her spokespeople.6 3 Cooperation with
Ardenia is evidently not possible.
Proportionate force is limited to targets whose elimination serves the
purpose of ending ZSM aggression.64 Rigalia's strikes are proportionate
because its intelligence and precision weaponry ensure they are directed
against ZSM members only.
D. Rigalia's use offorce against the ZSM does not violate the Zetian
people's right of self-determination
As Rigalia has ratified the ICCPR and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ('ICESCR'), it is obligated to respect
the Zetian people's right to self-determination.66  However, self-
determination is limited by the territorial integrity of States, the primacy of
which entitles Rigalia to quell the ZSM insurgency within its own
67territory. Rigalia's use of force does not deny Zetians' right of internal
self-determination, which only requires that States grant 'peoples' equal
68access to government. Zetian political autonomy and participation in
Rigalian politics prove that Rigalia respects Zetians' right to self-
69determination.
60. Compromis, [28].
61. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625, UN
Doc A/8082 (1970) ['Friendly Relations Declaration']; Armed Activities, n45, 227.
62. Compromis, [20].
63. Compromis, [19]-[20]; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ
Rep 4,18 ['Corfu Channel'].
64. Oil Platforms, n53, 196.
65. Compromis, [29].
66. ICCPR art 1(3); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1966]
993 UNTS 3, art 1(3) ['ICESCR']; East Timor, n6, 102.
67. Charter art 2(7); Friendly Relations Declaration, n61; Marcelo Kohen (ed), Secession:
International Law Perspectives (2006) 105.
68. Aaland Islands Question (Merits), Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of
Nations Council Doc B7 21/68/106 (1921) 4-5; Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217,
[126].
69. Compromis, [6], [9], [21].
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II. THE ATTACK ON THE BAKCHAR VALLEY HOSPITAL WAS NOT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO RIGALIA AND RIGALIA HAS NO OBLIGATION TO
INVESTIGATE THE ATTACK OR TO COMPENSATE ARDENIA; MOREOVER,
THE ACT WAS NOT AN ACT OF AGGRESSION BUT PART OF A LEGITIMATE
AND PROPORTIONATE OPERATION TO DEFEND AGAINST ZETIAN
TERRORISTS
Rigalia is not internationally responsible for the strike on Bakchar
Valley Hospital ('the Hospital'). It is not attributable to Rigalia and was, in
any event, lawful.70 Further, Rigalia is not obligated to investigate the
attack. Alternatively, this Court should not order an investigation by way of
remedy.
A. The Hospital strike is not attributable to Rigalia
Rigalia's connection with Morganian personnel does not satisfy any of
the established bases for attribution under the International Law
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility (ASR), which codify
customary rules of State responsibility. Further, Rigalia has not
71subsequently 'adopted and acknowledged' the strike as its own.
1. Morganian personnel involved in the strike did not exercise elements of
Rigalian governmental authority
Under article 5, the conduct of persons or entities 'empowered by the
law of [the] State to exercise elements of governmental authority' is
attributable to that State.72 Governmental authority connotes acting 'in
'73place of State organs'. It cannot be said that Morganian personnel are
acting in place of the Rigalian Defence Force (RDF). They exercise
autonomy in launching the strikes and are accountable to Morganian state
organs. Moreover, Morgania is motivated by a security interest distinct
from that of Rigalia.74
70. Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v France) (Preliminary Objections) [ 1938] PCU (ser A/B)
No 74, 28; ASR art 2.
71. ASR arts 5-8, 11.
72. ASR art 5; Shaw, International Law (6th ed, 2008) 787.
73. Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility:
Introduction, Text and Commentary (2002) 100 ['ASR Commentary'].
74. Compromis, [27].
2011] 295
296 ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law
2. Morganian personnel have not been placed at Rigalia's disposal
Morganian personnel have not been placed at Rigalia's disposal so as
to ground attribution under article 6. Article 6 requires that the receiving
State exclusively direct the conduct of the sending State's organ.75 As the
RDF is merely 'urging' Morgania to execute the strikes, 76 which remain
under Morgania's operational command, Rigalia is not exclusively
directing Morganian personnel involved in the strikes.
3. Morganian personnel did not act under Rigalia's effective control
The Hospital strike is not attributable to Rigalia on the basis of
'effective control' as codified in article 8 of the ASR.78 Attribution on this
basis requires control of Morganian personnel 'in respect of each operation
in which the alleged violations occurred' .79 The RDF and Defence
Minister's non-specific instructions to Morgania do not amount to effective
control over Morganian personnel because Morganian personnel retain
absolute discretion over target acquisition.80 In any event, as the drone
operator 'clearly went beyond' protocol in directly communicating with an
informant while executing the Hospital strike, her actions were ultra vires
any putative Rigalian instruction and thus not attributable to Rigalia.'
4. Rigalia has not subsequently 'adopted and acknowledged' the strike as
its own
This Court has only ever recognised adoption as a basis for attribution
of private conduct where there was a formal, unambiguous and long-
standing endorsement of the conduct in public statements.82 In contrast, the
Rigalian Defence Minister's press statement characterises the Hospital
strike as a 'consequence of Rigalia's fight to defend itself', which. stops
short of expressly adopting the conduct. As this statement is at best
75. ASR Commentary, n73, 103; Behrami v France (2007) 45 EHRR SEIO, 94.
76. Compromis, [28].
77. Compromis, [30].
78. Nicaragua, n27, 65.
79. Bosnian Genocide, n24, [400]; Nicaragua, n27, 65; ASR art 8.
80. Compromis, [29].
81. ASR Commentary, n73, 113; Compromis, [30]-[31].
82. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran) (Merits)
[1980] ICJ Rep 3, 33-35; ASR art 11.
83. Compromis, [31].
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ambiguous, this Court should defer to the Rigalian Head of State's official
disclaimer of responsibility in a diplomatic note.8
B. The Hospital strike was not internationally wrongful
Assuming its attribution to Rigalia, the Hospital strike was
nevertheless lawful as it occurred in the exercise of Rigalia's right of self-
defence.8 5 Further, the Hospital strike was not of sufficient gravity to
constitute an act of aggression. The strike was also consistent with Rigalia's
customary IHL obligations. As discussed above, Rigalia's IHL compliance
also discharges its obligations under article 6 of the ICCPR.
1. The Hospital strike was not an act of aggression
Even assuming the Hospital strike cannot be justified as self-defence,
it was not an act of aggression. An act of aggression is 'the most serious
and dangerous form of the illegal use of force' inconsistent with the
Charter.7 It must be of 'sufficient gravity' in light of the 'relevant
circumstances'.88 The Hospital strike does not meet this threshold. In the
Armed Activities case, this Court declined the Congo's request to make a
finding of aggression where Uganda had invaded 'vast areas' of the Congo,
occupied the Ituri region, and caused many thousands of casualties over six
years.89 Hence, a significantly less invasive and deadly trespass into
Ardenia cannot possibly constitute an act of aggression.
2. The attack complied with Rigalia's IHL and IHRL obligations
The Hospital strike complied with Rigalia's IHL obligations given the
military necessity of killing Bermal.90 The distraction of the Morganian
drone operator during the execution of the attack constituted human error
and, as such, does not breach the proportionality and discrimination
principles. This is because 'errors of targeting' which occur in the context
of a lawful attack do not constitute breaches of IHL.91
84. Compromis, [34].
85. Rigalian Memorial, 8-11.
86. Rigalian Memorial, 7.
87. Definition ofAggression, GA Res 3314, UN Doc A/RES/3314 (1974) Preamble, art 6.
88. Id, art 2.
89. Armed Activities, n45, 224.
90. Hague Convention, Preamble.
91. Partial Award Regarding Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims
Eritrea's Claims (Judicial and Similar Proceedings) (2006) 45 IM 396, 415; Dinstein, n37, 135.
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Nor can Ardenia impugn the broader attack on IHL grounds. Bermal,
as.a 'top separatist commander' and 'major decision-maker in... all military
activities in Rigalia',92 had assumed a continuous combat function and was
therefore a lawful target at any time.93
Rigalia took feasible precautions to minimise civilian casualties in
addition to verifying lawful targets.94 Rigalia need not have postponed its
attack until it could target Bermal without prospect of civilian casualties
because it was permitted to take into account his strategic role in the ZSM
and the fact that his whereabouts might not have been known again for
some time.95 Moreover, Rigalia need not have warned civilians because the
element of surprise was crucial to operational success.96
Further, the attack was not disproportionate as expected civilian loss
was not excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage
anticipated. Killing Bermal had the significant military advantage of
curbing 'increasingly deadly'98 ZSM attacks in Rigalia. The pre-attack
expectation of seven civilian casualties was comparatively low.
C. Rigalia is not obligated to investigate the attack under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Rigalia's obligation not to deprive individuals of life arbitrarily under
article 6 of the ICCPR does not extend to Ardenian territory.99 Even if it
did, what is 'arbitrary' for the purposes of article 6 fell to be determined by
IHL in accordance with the interpretive principle of lex specialis 00 As the
strikes were IHL-compliant they necessarily complied with article 6.01 The
right to an effective remedy arises only upon the breach of a Covenant
obligation. 10 2 As Rigalia has complied with article 6, no remedial obligation
of this kind has arisen.
92. Compromis, [30].
93. DPH Study, n31, 34; Rigalian Memorial, 5.
94. Rigalian Memorial, 5-6.
95. Compromis, [28].
96. Fleck, n29, 196-197; CIHL Rules, n29, 62-65 (Rule 20).
97. CIHL Rules, n29, 46-50 (Rule 14).
98. Compromis, [28].
99. Rigalian Memorial, 7.
100. Nuclear Weapons, n29, 257.
101. Rigalian Memorial, 7.
102. ICCPR art 2.
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D. In any event, an investigation should not be ordered as reparation
If the Court finds that Rigalia is responsible for the Hospital strike,
Rigalia is obligated to make full reparation for any injury caused.10 3 This
Court may award satisfaction only insofar as restitution and compensation
cannot make good a State's wrongful act.'" Investigation is not an
'appropriate modality' of satisfaction for the Hospital strike.'os The Court's
ruling at the preliminary objections phase precludes any order that would
determine Morgania's rights and obligations.'0 As any investigation would
necessitate inquiry into the conduct of Morganian personnel, the order
would be futile.
III. RIGALIA'S BAN OF THE MAVAZI FOR ZETIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS IS
CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Rigalia's prohibition on wearing the Mavazi in public spaces and when
receiving public services is a permissible limitation on the rights of Zetian
women and girls under the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CROC), and the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms ofDiscrimination against Women (CEDA W).
A. Ardenia lacks standing to contest the legality of the ban
Human rights treaties confer rights on individuals, not States.10 7 The
ban operates exclusively in Rigalia, causing Ardenia no direct injury.
As Zetians are dual Rigalian-Ardenian nationals,'0o Ardenia cannot
exercise diplomatic protection on their behalf unless the nationality of
Zetians affected by the ban is predominantly Ardenian.' 09 Ardenia cannot
demonstrate that the 'predominant nationality' of Zetians living in Rigalia
is Ardenian, given their 'habitual residence' in Rigalia and the absence of
any evidence countervailing this 'important factor'."o
103. Factory at Chorz6w (Claim for Indemnity) [1928] PCIJ (Ser A) No 17,47-48; ASR art 31.
104. ASR art 37(1).
105. ASR art 37(2).
106. Statute of the International Court ofJustice [1945] 1 UNTS 993, art 59; Compromis, [36].
107. HRC, General Comment 24, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) [17].
108. Compromis, [8].
109. ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, UN Doc A/61/10
(2006) art 7 ['DPA with Commentaries']; Case No A/18 (1984) 5 Iran-USCTR 251, 263.
110. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Second Phase) [1955] ICJ Rep 4, 22; DPA with
Commentaries, n 109, 46.
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B. The ban permissibly limits freedom of religion and minority culture
under the ICCPR and the CROC
1. The ban permissibly limits religious freedom under article 18(3) of the
ICCPR
The ban on the Mavazi, a Masinto headcovering worn by Zetian
women, permissibly limits the religious freedom of Zetian women and girls.
It is prescribed by law" and is necessary to protect public safety and order,
and the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.1 2 President Khutai's
parliamentary speech introducing the ban attests to these legitimate aims.113
The scope of ICCPR rights may be interpreted in light of subsequent
State practice in the treaty's application.' 14 Parties to the ICCPR and the
European Convention on Human Rights consider de facto bans on wearing
the burqa or niqab in public"' or when receiving a public servicell 6 to be
permissible limitations on religious freedom.' '7
a. Rigalia is afforded a 'margin of appreciation'
The European Court of Human Rights affords States a 'margin of
appreciation' when they limit rights, given their better understanding of
local conditions."' Rigalia's margin of appreciation is determined by
reference to the pressing social need to protect the rights of oppressed
Zetian women and girls." 9
111. Maestri v Italy (2004) 39 EHRR 38, 843; Compromis, [16], [21].
112. ICCPR art 18(3).
113. Sahin v Turkey (2007) 44 EHRR 5, 124 ['Sahin']; Compromis, [16].
114. VCLT art 31(3)(b).
115. Belgian Parliament, Proposition de Loi no 5-255/1: Interdiction de se couvrir le visage
d'une manikre rendant impossible toute identification de la personne (2010); French National
Assembly, Loi no 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans I'espace
public (2010); Italian Council of Ministers, Nuove norme per il contrasto del terrorismo internazionale
e della criminalithi (2005) art 10; Tunisian Executive Decree, Circulaire no 81 (1981).
116. US Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (2010)
(citing, inter alia, the practice of Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Kosovo, Maldives, Tajikistan,
Tunisia and Turkey).
117. Article 9(2) is substantially similar to article 18(3) of the ICCPR: Taylor, Freedom of
Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (2005) 292-93; Convention for the
Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1950] 213 UNTS 222, art 9(2).
118. Handyside v UK (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, 754; $ahin, n113, 127; Shany, 'Toward a
General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?' (2005) 16 European Journal of
International Law 907, 919.
119. Sahin,nil3,127.
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b. The ban is necessary to protect public safety
The freedom to manifest religious belief may be restricted where it
endangers lives or property.120 The Mavazi enables Zetian separatists to
conceal their identity when approaching public targets. 12' The ban is
proportionate and within Rigalia's 'margin of appreciation'. Less restrictive
limitations, such as mandatory identification measures, would be
impracticable given how many Zetians wear the Mavazi and Rigalia's
inability to effectively control the Northern Provinces.122
c. The ban is necessary to protect public order
The prevention of religious or political extremism may justify
limitations to protect public order.12 3 The ban is necessary on these grounds
because the Mavazi perpetuates a culture of systemic violence antithetical
to the enjoyment of ICCPR rights.12 4 The Zetian tribal councils' violent
imposition of the Mavazi on women has given rise to a system of
extrajudicial punishment, which compromises the integrity of the Rigalian
legal system.12 5
d. The ban is necessary to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others
Rigalia may restrict the freedom to manifest religious belief in order to
protect fundamental rights, as enshrined in the ICCPR and ICESCR.126 The
ban is necessary to protect gender equality and alleviate pressure on women
to wear the Mavazi.127
The requirement that women wear the Mavazi is incompatible with
gender equality. It applies only to women and impedes their social, cultural
and economic lives.12 8 The ban is also necessary to relieve pressure on
Zetian women and girls to wear the Mavazi, which tribal leaders consider a
120. Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the ICCPR, UN
Doc E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984) [33].
121. Compromis, [18].
122. Compromis, [3]-[4].
123. Sahin, ni13, 127; Refah Partisi v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1, 44 ['Refah Partisi'];
Karaduman v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 93, [95].
124. Dahlab v Switzerland, ECHR, App No 42393/98 (15 February 2001).
125. Compromis, [3]-[4].
126. ICCPR art 18(3); Nowak, n44, 385.
127. Sahin, n113, 127-28; Dogru v France (2009)49 EHRR 8,197-98.
128. Refah Partisi, n123, 44; Compromis, [3]-[4].
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'compulsory religious duty'.1 29 Prohibiting the wearing of the Mavazi by all
Zetian women renders it impractical for tribal leaders to inflict inhuman
punishment on them.13 0 The ban is also required by Rigalia's due diligence
obligation under the CEDA W to prevent violence against women, given the
Mavazi's imposition perpetuates a culture of gender-based violence.' 3 '
The ban is proportionate to the protection of the rights of Zetian
women and girls.'32 Merely criminalising the imposition of the Mavazi is
unfeasible, as Rigalia cannot distinguish between women who choose to
wear the Mavazi and women who do so out of fear of reprisal. Moreover,
Zetians otherwise remain free to practise the Masinto religion.'33
2. The ban does not violate the rights of Zetian women and girls under
article 27 of the ICCPR to enjoy their minority culture and religion
a. The ban permissibly limits article 27 rights
The right of members of a minority to practise their own religion is
subject to the same limitations as in article 18(3),134 which Rigalia has
satisfied. 3 1
b. Rigalia has lawfully derogatedfrom article 27
Rigalia may derogate from article 27 during officially proclaimed
public emergencies threatening 'the life of the nation'.' 36 The ZSM
campaign constitutes such a threat, as increasing separatist attacks
compromise Rigalia's territorial integrity. 3 7 The ban is 'strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation'.'3 It prevents terrorists avoiding detection
by wearing the Mavazi during attacks. The ban is not discriminatory as 'it
129. Sahin, nl13, 128.
130. ICCPR art 7; Nowak, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, UN Doc
A/HRC/7/3/Add.7 (2008) [17].
131. CEDAW arts 1, 2(a), 2(c)-(f), 3; CEDW, Yddirim v Austria, UN Doc
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (2007) [12.3] ['Yddirum']; Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, [77];
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDW), General Recommendation
19, UN Doc A/47/38 (1992) [6], [10]-[ 11].
132. Rigalian Memorial, 21.
133. Sahin,n113, 129.
134. Bossuyt, Guide to the 'travauxprdparatoires'ofthe ICCPR (1987) 497; VCLT art 32.
135. Rigalian Memorial, 19-23.
136. ICCPR art 4(1).
137. Lawless v lreland (1979-80) 1 EHRR 15, 31-32.
138. ICCPR art 4(1).
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applies to all persons without distinction'.' 39 The requirement to formally
notify other States does not alter the effectiveness of the derogation.'4 0
3. The ban permissibly limits the right of Zetian girls to freedom of
religion and minority culture under articles 14 and 30 of the CROC
Zetian girls' freedom to enjoy their religion and minority culture under
articles 14 and 30 of the CROC is subject to the same limitations applying
to articles 18 and 27 of the ICCPR.141 For reasons given above, the ban
permissibly limits these rights.14 2
Further, the ban is consistent with the 'best interests of the child' .143
This principle applies collectively to Zetian girls.'" The religious freedom
of children may be restricted if it is in their best interests,145 consistent with
Rigalia's duty to protect minors. 14 6 The ban is in the best interests of Zetian
girls because they cannot freely choose to wear the restrictive Mavazi given
their socialisation to patriarchal norms.147
C. The prohibition on receiving public services while wearing the Mavazi
does not violate the economic, social and cultural rights ofZetian women
and girls
1. Ardenia's claim does not give rise to a separate question in relation to
economic, social and cultural rights
The scope of permissible limitations on religious and minority rights is
the central issue before the Court, and 'no separate question' arises in
relation to economic, social and cultural rights.14 8 Further, nothing suggests
the ban will affect the access to public services of those women wearing the
139. ICCPR arts 2, 3; HRC, Bhinder v Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/208/1986 (1989) [6.1]
['Bhinder'].
140. HRC, Silva v Uruguay, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 65 (1984) [8.3].
141. CROC arts 14(3), 30; Detrick, A Commentary on the UNCROC (1999) 248, 535.
142. Rigalian Memorial, 19-24.
143. CROC art 3; Detrick, n141, 90.
144. Hodgkin and Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (2007) 36-37.
145. Xv UK, EHCR, App No 7992/77 (12 July 1978) 235; Bhinder, n139, [6.2].
146. ICCPR art 24; CROC art 36; Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Concluding
Observations: Jamaica UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.210, [33].
147. Cv Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) [2009] 2 SCR 181, [72]-[73].
148. Sahin,ni13, 138; Dogru, nl27, 201.
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Mavazi, given the Northern Provinces are 'largely governed by the tribal
councils'.149
2. Alternatively, the ban permissibly limits the economic, social and
cultural rights of Zetian women and girls under article 4 of the ICESCR
Rigalia may limit the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights if the limitation is 'compatible with the nature of [ICESCR] rights
and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic
s 150society'.
To be 'compatible with the nature' of ICESCR rights, the substance of
the limitation cannot jeopardise the essence of the rights."5 ' The prohibition
on wearing the Mavazi while receiving public services does not
compromise the essence of the right of access to services, as Zetian women
and girls may continue to have access to these services if they comply with
the ban. 15 2
The ban is also necessary for the 'general welfare' of Rigalian society.
As discussed above, the ban enables the functioning of public services by
promoting the safety of public buildings.s 3 Further, women's oppression
contributes to poverty in the Northern Provinces by, for example,
preventing women from working.154 The ban will ultimately facilitate the
Zetian community's greater enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights. 55
3. The ban is permissible under the CROC
Rigalia is required to 'undertake all appropriate legislative' measures
to respect children's right to equal enjoyment of economic, social and
cultural rights.'56 The right to access public services under the CROC is not
absolute since 'its very nature calls for regulation by the State' according to
149. Compromis, [3].
150. ICESCR art 4.
151. Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/13 (1986) [56].
152. Sahin, nil 13, 135; Begum v Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100, 118 ['Begum'].
153. Rigalian Memorial, 21.
154. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Concluding Observations:
India UN Doc E/C. 12/IND/CO/5 [25], (65].
155. Masstricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc
E/C.12/2000/13 (1997) art 14(d).
156. CROCart4.
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community needs. 17 The ban permissibly limits girls' right to education
under article 28 of the CROC. The ban is reasonable and adheres to the
'best interests of the child' principle, 58 as it protects girls who may be
pressured to wear the Mavazi at school.159 Further, the prohibition preserves
security by preventing unidentified people entering schools. The prohibition
does not deny the essence of the right - to access education - as students
can attend school by not wearing the Mavazi.160
D. Rigalia is required to implement the Mavazi ban under the CEDA W
Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of the CEDA W create a substantive obligation to
eliminate discriminatory cultural patterns.16 ' The articles prioritise gender
equality over respect for cultural and religious practices. 6 2 The requirement
that Zetian women wear the Mavazi is a discriminatory cultural pattern:
forcibly imposing a garment that prevents safe driving and outdoor work is
predicated on the assumption that women, by virtue of their gender, cannot
or should not do these things.'63 The Mavazi prevents women enjoying
equal employment opportunities and safe working conditions, thus violating
the CEDA W.64
157. Sahin, ni 13, [154]; Belgian Linguistic Case (Merits) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252 (1968) 281
['Belgian Linguistic Case']; Fayedv UK(1994) 18 EHRR 393,429.
158. Detrick, nl41, 92.
159. Dogru, n127, 199; Sahin, nl 13, 127-128; Begum, n152, 694.
160. Belgian Linguistic Case, n 157, 28.
161. CEDW, Vertido vPhilippines, UN Doc CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (2010) [8.4].
162. CEDW, Concluding Observations: Gabon, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GAB/CC/2-5 (2005)
[30]-[31]; CEDW, Concluding Observations: Pakistan UN Doc CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/3 (2007) [28];
Initial Report: Tajikistan, UN Doc CEDAWC/TJK/l-3 (2005) 11.
163. Compronis, [4]-[7]; CEDW, Concluding Observations: Saudi Arabia, UN Doc
CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2 (2008) [15]-[16].
164. CEDA Warts 11(b), 11(f).
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IV. ARDENIA'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE THE ALLEGED
CORRUPTION AND TO PROVIDE LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO RIGALIA
CONSTITUTE BREACHES OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION, AND
THE FAILURE OF THE ARDENIAN NCP TO RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT BY
THE CRBC CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF THE OECD DECISION ON MNE
GUIDELINES
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ('OABC') requires States Parties
to criminalise the bribery of a foreign public official ('the offence').'65 The
OECD Decision on MNE Guidelines ('Decision')'6 6 requires that adherents
establish a National Contact Point (NCP) for handling complaints under the
OECD MNE Guidelines (Guidelines), which are non-binding standards of
responsible business conduct.16 7
These instruments, to which Ardenia and. Rigalia are parties,66 are
binding agreements governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.'69 Accordingly, States Parties must interpret their obligations
under each instrument in good faith; that is, 'honestly, fairly and
reasonably','17 0 and in light of the instrument's purpose, subsequent State
'practice in [its] application', and any 'relevant rules of international
iaW.'.171
There exist two allegations that, if proven, would constitute the
offence: first, that Mineral Dynamics Incorporated (MDI) secured the
renewal of its contract with Rigalian Refineries Incorporated (RRI) by
offering payments and support to third parties, namely the Zetian Refugee
Fund (ZRF) and Clyde Zangara ('the Contract Allegation'); and second,
that MDI transporters made payments to members of the tribal councils
('the Transporters Allegation').172 Ardenia's response to these allegations
violated the OABC.
In addition, the alleged conduct of MDI and RRI potentially breached
the Guidelines. As it was the subject of the CRBC's complaint, Ardenia's
165. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (1998) 37 ILM 4 art 1 ['OABC'].
166. OECD, Decision of the Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
C(2000)96/FINAL (2000) 1.1 ['Decision'].
167. OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000) 9 ['Guidelines'].
168. Compromis, [38].
169. VCLT art 2(a); Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development [1960] 888 UNTS 179 art 5 ['OECD Convention'].
170. Villiger, n7, 425.
171. VCLTart31.
172. Compromis, [12], [22].
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obligations under the Decision were enlivened. Ardenia's NCP violated the
Decision in its handling of the complaint.
These violations directly injured Rigalia. Ardenia's obligations were
owed to all States Parties and its violations 'specially affected' Rigalia
because of their impact on a Rigalian State-owned company and non-
governmental organisation.173
A. Ardenia's failure to investigate and prosecute the alleged corruption
breached article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ('OABC')
1. In responding to alleged offences under the OABC, States Parties must
exercise their prosecutorial discretion in conformity with article 5
Article 5 requires that States Parties investigate allegations of the
offence.174 Subsequent State practice in interpreting article 5 confirms that
States Parties are bound to investigate any 'well-founded suspicion" 75 of
the offence and prosecute where sufficiently 'credible' evidence 76 creates a
'realistic prospect of conviction'. Further, article 5 expressly prohibits
States Parties from allowing 'considerations of national economic interest,
the potential effect upon relations with another state, or the identity of the
natural or legal persons involved' to influence investigations and
prosecutions of the offence. 78
2. In responding to the alleged corruption, Ardenia did not exercise its
prosecutorial discretion in conformity with article 5
a. Ardenia failed to investigate the allegations reported in 2002
The 2002 media reports, which first raised the Contract and
Transporters Allegations, created a well-founded suspicion of the
offence. 79 State practice confirms that article 5 requires States to
173. ASR art 42(b)(i); ASR Commentary, n73, 119.
174. Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (1998) 37 ILM 8, [27] ['OABC Commentary'].
175. OECD, Hungary - Phase 1 Implementation Report (2003) 13 [Hereinafter 'Hungary-Ph. 1
(2003) 13']; UK-Ph.2 (2005) 48; Luxembourg-Ph.2 (2004) 23.
176. US-Ph.3 (2010) 19; Austria-Ph.2 (2006) 29-31.
177. UK-Ph.2 (2005) 51; France-Ph.2 (2003) 28; Canada-Ph.2 (2005) 33.
178. OABC art 5.
179. Compromis, [12].
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proactively seek further evidence in response to such media reports. so
Ardenia's failure to follow up the reports breached article 5.
b. Ardenia failed to prosecute the allegations
The Contract Allegation triggered Ardenia's obligation to prosecute
because it was substantiated by an MDI employee directly involved in the
negotiations.181 His statement established a realistic prospect of conviction.
It indicated that MDI had committed the offence by 'intentionally' offering
and giving 'undue pecuniary ... advantage[s]' to third parties so that Bikra,
as the official of a Rigalian public enterprise affiliated with the third
parties,182 would renew MDI's contract.183
Further, the employee's statement enlivened Ardenia's obligation to
prosecute the Transporters Allegation. It provided credible evidence that
MDI transporters had made payments to tribal council members. These
members are foreign public officials because they are office-bearers in an
'autonomous' region, the Northern Provinces.184 The transporters sought an
improper advantage as MDI was not 'clearly entitled"85 to additional
security or the 'smooth delivery' of its products.'8 6 As the fees were
undocumented 87 and intended to induce the performance of unofficial,
discretionary tasks,'88 they did not fall within the offence's 'small
facilitation payments' exception.' 89
180. Bulgaria-Ph.2 (2003) 10; Japan-Ph.2 (2005) 5; UK-Ph.2 (2005) 8, 48; Luxembourg-Ph.2
(2004) 23; Italy-Ph.2 (2004) 25; Korea-Ph.2 (2004) 7; OECD Working Group on Bribery, Annual
Report (2009) 26-31.
181. Compromis, [22].
182. OABC Commentary, n174, [14]-[15].
183. OABCart1(1).
184 OABC Commentary, n174, [18]; Zerbes, 'Article 1: The Offence of Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials', in Pieth et al (eds), The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary (2007) 73-74;
Compromis, [6].
185. OABC Commentary, nl74, [5]; US vKay 359 F.3d 738 (2004).
186. Compromis, [22].
187. OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, C(2009)159/REVl/FINAL (2009) art 6; Australia-
Ph.1 (2000) 7.
188. New Zealand-Ph.1 (2002) 8; US-Ph.2 (2002) 34, 38; Switzerland-Ph.1 (2000) 22.
189. OABC Commentary, n174, [9].
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c. In any event, Ardenia suspended its investigation in violation ofarticle 5
The influence of national security concerns on Ardenia's decision to
suspend the investigation breached article 5.190 Subsequent interpretation of
the OABC confirms that article 5 prohibits States from allowing national
security considerations to influence enforcement of the offence.1 9'
In any event, national security has only been recognised as a
permissible consideration where continuing an investigation would expose
a State to 'multiple loss of life'.19 2 No such risk existed in June 2009, as
ZSM violence was confined to Rigalia' 93 and Ardenia maintained 'friendly
ties' with the Zetians.194
Further, this Court may infer that other considerations prohibited by
article 5 influenced the suspension. 195 President Arwen's contemporaneous
statement, against Ardenian interests, that the suspension was 'founded in
part on a concern over ... the loss of hundreds of jobs and millions of
dollars'196 is 'highly probative' 97 evidence that considerations of 'national
economic interest' influenced the suspension. Further, this Court may draw
the inference that 'the identity of the ... legal person involved' influenced
the decision because Ardenia has not proffered evidence, to which it has
exclusive access, as to whether the Ardenian Public Prosecutor met with
MDI lobbyists'98 or attended MDI functions.'99
B. Ardenia's failure to provide prompt and effective legal assistance in
response to Rigalia's mutual legal assistance (MLA) request breaches
article 9 of the OABC
Article 9(1) of the OABC requires Parties to 'provide prompt and
effective legal assistance' when requested by any Party bringing
190. Compromis, [25].
191. VCLT art 31(1); Germany-Ph.2 (2003) 37; Cullen, 'Article 5: Enforcement', in Pieth et al
(eds), n184, 322; Rose-Ackerman and Billa, 'Treaties and National Security Exceptions' (2008) 40 New
York Journal ofInternational Law and Politics 441, 458; UK-Ph.2bis (2008) 46.
192. R (On the Application of Corner House Research and Others) v Director of the Serious
Fraud Office [2009] 1 AC 756, 846 (Lord Bingham); Cullen, nl91, 325; France-Ph.2 (2004) 31; Japan-
Ph.2 (2005) 57; UK-Ph.2 (2005) 55.
193. UK-Ph.2bis (2008) 46.
194. Compromis, [20]-[21 ].
195. Japan-Ph.2 (2005) 57.
196. Compromis, [25].
197. Nicaragua, n27, 41.
198. Compromis, [25]; UK-Ph.2 (2005) 36.
199. Corfu Channel, n63, 18.
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investigations and proceedings 'within the scope of the Convention'. Parties
cannot decline assistance on bank secrecy grounds. 20 0 Rigalia's MLA
request enlivened these obligations. Though Rigalia made the request on 30
April 2009, Ardenia has not provided assistance. Accordingly, Ardenia
breached its obligation to provide prompt assistance.
1. Rigalia's request enlivened Ardenia's article 9 obligations
Rigalia's request was made for the purpose of an investigation 'within
the scope of the Convention'. It therefore triggered Ardenia's article 9
obligations. President Khutai's attempt to pressure Ardenia by requesting
the investigation did not violate article 5.201 This is because article 5 is
concerned only with attempts by States to evade the enforcement of the
offence. It does not apply to requests to open investigations. This is
consistent with subsequent State practice 2 02 and the OABC's purpose of
promoting vigorous enforcement.2 03
2. Ardenia did not provide prompt assistance in response to Rigalia's
request
Consistent with the ordinary meaning of 'prompt' and subsequent
State practice, States Parties must provide legal assistance as a matter of
204priority. In failing to satisfy Rigalia's request for over one year, Ardenia
breached article 9.
3. Ardenia's failure to provide prompt assistance is not excused by the
reasons it provided
Ardenia's failure to provide prompt assistance to Rigalia is not
excused by either of the reasons it gave at the Phase 2 WGB
Examination.205 Ardenia's bank secrecy legislation does not justify its
failure to provide prompt assistance as such legislation can only justify
short, procedural delays.2 06 Further, the irrelevance of ZRF-Council
200. OABC art 9(3).
201. Compromis, [22].
202. France-Ph.2 (2004) 29, 31; UK-Ph. 2 (2005) 53; Denmark-Ph.1 (2000) 17; Netherlands-
Ph.1 (2001) 22; New Zealand-Ph.1 (2002) 20.
203. OABC Commentary, nl74, 27.
204. Luxembourg-Ph.2 (2004) 30; Poland-Ph.2 (2007) 37; New Zealand-Ph.2 (2006) 43;
Bulgaria-Ph.2 (2003) 39-40; Compromis, [23].
205. Compromis, [23].
206. OABC art 9(3); Poland-Ph.2 (2007) 37; Switzerland-Ph.2 (2004) 28-29; Israel -Ph.2
(2009) 40-41; South Africa-Ph.2 (2010) 53-54.
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correspondence could not excuse its delay, as defects in a request will only
justify delays where those defects have promptly been brought to the
requesting party's attention.20 7
In any event, Ardenia provided no reason for its failure to provide the
other evidence requested by Rigalia.
C. The failure of the Ardenian NCP to respond to the CRBC's complaint
breached the OECD Decision on MINE Guidelines
Ardenia's NCP was obligated to respond to complaints under the
Guidelines in conformity with the Decision and its Procedural Guidance.208
Under the Procedural Guidance, NCPs may determine whether any
complaint under the Guidelines 'merit[s] further consideration'. 2 09 The
criteria for assessing the merit of a complaint, enumerated in the
Procedural Guidance, are non-specific. 2 10 Accordingly, subsequent State
practice is instructive in determining the lawfulness of an NCP's
response.21 Ardenia breached the Decision because its NCP failed to
comply with the Procedural Guidance in handling the CRBC's complaint.
1. Ardenia's NCP could not refuse to respond to the CRBC's complaint as
it merited further consideration
a. Ardenia's NCP was an appropriate forum for the CRBC's complaint
NCPs must respond to complaints where their involvement is essential
to resolving the issues raised, irrespective of where the misconduct
occurred.212 As Ardenian assistance was necessary for obtaining crucial
evidence, Ardenia's NCP could not reject the complaint on the basis that
the CRBC should have contacted Rigalia's NCP.213 Furthermore, MDI's
status as an Ardenian-owned corporation imposed a heightened obligation
214
on Ardenia's NCP to accept thecomplaint.
207. Switzerland-Ph.2 (2004) 27-28; Estonia-Ph.2 (2008) 33-34; Portugal-Ph.2 (2007) 38-40.
208. Decision, n166.
209. Decision, 'Procedural Guidance', n166, C.I.
210. Ibid.
211. VCLT art 31(3)(b); OECD, Annual Report on the OECD Guidelines (2010) 4.
212. Norway NCP, Final Statement: Konsberg Automotive (2009) 4 [Hereinafter 'Norway
NCP, Konsberg (2009)']; UK NCP, BTC Oil Pipeline (2004); Norway NCP, Cermaq ASA (2009).
213. Compromis, [23].
214. OECD Watch, Model National Contact Point (2007) 16; Compromis, [10].
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b. Ardenia's NCP could not reject the complaint on the basis ofparallel
legal proceedings
An NCP's discretion to reject a complaint on the basis of 'parallel
legal proceedings' is limited to situations where substantively similar issues
have been resolved in prior proceedings or where an MNE declines
involvement in the NCP process. 215 As investigations into the alleged
conduct have not resolved the issues and the relevant MNEs have not
declined involvement, Ardenia's NCP could not reject the complaint on this
basis.
c. Ardenia's NCP could not reject the complaint on the basis that the
OECD MNE Guidelines do not apply to RPR
Ardenia's NCP could not reject the complaint on the ground that the
Guidelines did not apply to RRI. States Parties have interpreted the
Guidelines' expansive definition of a multinational enterprise2 16 to
encompass companies exhibiting sustained dependence on a foreign
company's supply of goods. 2 17 As RRI has depended on MDI-supplied
coltan for a decade, it is a multinational enterprise to which the Guidelines
apply. It breached the Guidelines by allegedly demanding bribes.218
Regardless, Ardenia's NCP was required to examine those parts of the
complaint concerning MDI.219
2. In any event, Ardenia's NCP breached its obligation to respond to the
CRBC's meeting request
The Ardenian NCP's obligation to cooperate with other NCPs required
it to contact Rigalia's NCP after determining it was the proper forum for the
CRBC's complaint.2 20 Accordingly, its decision to ignore the CRBC's joint
meeting request and failure to otherwise contact Rigalia's NCP breached
the Decision.
215. UK NCP, Unilever (2010) [12]; Netherlands NCP, PSPC (2009) 4; Ireland NCP, Corrib
Gas Project (2008) 5.
216. Guidelines, n167, 12.
217. Guidelines, n167, 58; UK NCP, Afrimex (2008) [29]-[51]; Australia NCP, ANZ (2006)
[10]; Netherlands NCP, Chemical Pharmacy Holland (2004) 3; OECD, Annual Report on the OECD
Guidelines (2003) 21-22.
218. Guidelines, n167, 29.
219. Australia NCP, GSL (2006) [4]; UK NCP, Hindustan Lever (2008) [10]; France NCP,
Nam Theun 2 (2005).
220. Decision, n166, 1.2; France NCP, Aspocomp (2003); Australia NCP, ANZ (2006);
Netherlands NCP, NCP Annual Report (2009) 5.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Rigalia respectfully requests
this Honourable Court to adjudge and declare:
A. that Ardenia does not have standing in this Court in relation to the
strikes in Rigalia or, alternatively, that Rigalia's drone strikes in
Rigalia and Ardenia comply with international law, and that an
order for cessation is therefore unavailable;
B. that the attack on Bakchar Valley Hospital is neither attributable
to Rigalia, nor internationally wrongful in any way, and that
Rigalia has no obligation to investigate or to compensate
Ardenia;
C. that Rigalia's Mavazi ban is consistent with international law; and
D. that Ardenia has breached the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by
failing to investigate and prosecute MDI's alleged corruption and
to provide legal assistance to Rigalia, and that Ardenia's NCP
breached the OECD Decision on MNE Guidelines by failing to
respond to the CRBC's complaint.
3132011] -
